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CIVIL PROCEDURE AND 
THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 
Peter J. Smith* & Robert W. Tuttle** 
 
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, the 
U.S. Supreme Court recognized a ministerial exception to the ordinary rules 
of employer liability.  The Court also concluded that the exception operates 
as an affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional bar.  This conclusion 
raises quite significant questions about how courts should address the 
exception in the course of litigation. 
This Article posits that courts should approach these procedural questions 
in light of the underlying justification for the ministerial exception.  The 
exception reflects a longstanding constitutional limitation on the competence 
of courts to resolve “strictly and purely ecclesiastical” questions.  To 
conclude that the exception operates as an affirmative defense does not alter 
this fundamental limitation on the authority of secular courts. 
As a practical matter, this means that in litigation between religious 
institutions and their employees, courts may be required to manage discovery 
to resolve threshold questions about the application of the ministerial 
exception before permitting broader discovery.  Similarly, courts should 
consider permitting interlocutory appeals of trial court decisions that deny 
motions for summary judgment based on the exception.  And courts not only 
should conclude that religious institutions do not waive the defense by failing 
to raise it but also ought to raise it sua sponte when the facts indicate that 
the exception may apply.  These departures from the ordinary treatment of 
affirmative defenses are necessary to respect the constitutional principles 
that the Court articulated in Hosanna-Tabor. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,1 the 
U.S. Supreme Court for the first time recognized the existence of a 
“ministerial exception” to the ordinary rules of liability arising out of the 
employment relationship between clergy and religious institutions.2  The 
Court concluded that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment “bar the 
government from interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one 
of its ministers.”3  As a consequence, a minister generally cannot recover 
from her religious employer for employment discrimination or related claims.  
Although the Hosanna-Tabor Court declined to articulate a clear test for 
determining when an employee is a minister, it concluded that the plaintiff in 
the suit was a minister for purposes of the exception.4 
Before the Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor, lower courts had divided 
over whether the ministerial exception deprived courts of subject matter 
jurisdiction to consider a ministerial employee’s claims or instead operated 
as a defense to liability.5  The Court resolved this debate in a footnote in its 
opinion in Hosanna-Tabor.6  The Court declared that the exception operates 
as an affirmative defense rather than as a jurisdictional bar.7  This Article 
addresses both the underlying justification for this conclusion and its 
practical consequences. 
To understand the significance of these questions, it is useful to consider a 
hypothetical suit.  Imagine that an African American female minister served 
a congregation for several years without any complaints.  With virtually no 
notice, the church council, composed exclusively of white men, recently 
voted to fire her pursuant to their authority under the church’s governing 
documents.  They explained to the minister that they were terminating her 
because of the poor quality of her sermons and their perception that her 
prayers increasingly departed from settled doctrines of the faith tradition.  
 
 1. 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
 2. Id. at 190. 
 3. Id. at 181. 
 4. Id. at 190 (“We are reluctant . . . to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an 
employee qualifies as a minister.  It is enough for us to conclude, in this our first case involving 
the ministerial exception, that the exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her 
employment.”). 
 5. See infra notes 53–63 and accompanying text. 
 6. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4. 
 7. Id. 
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The discharged minister responded by filing a claim with the local office of 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging 
discrimination on the basis of race and gender.  The EEOC declined to 
become involved in the suit and granted the minister a “right-to-sue” letter.  
She then filed suit in federal district court seeking back pay, reinstatement, 
and attorney’s fees. 
In a typical employment discrimination suit, where the plaintiff 
demonstrates a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer can respond 
by offering a nondiscriminatory justification for the adverse employment 
action.8  The plaintiff can then argue that the employer’s proffered 
justification is pretextual, and the finder of fact must determine the actual 
basis for the adverse employment decision.9  Matters are more complicated 
when the defendant is a religious organization.  Title VII, and comparable 
state protections against employment discrimination,10 provides that 
religious organizations are not bound by the prohibitions against 
discrimination on the basis of religion.11  Accordingly, an avowed atheist 
cannot recover under Title VII for religious discrimination when a church 
refuses to hire him, even if the position is not one that involves leading 
worship, religious education, or any other religious activity.12 
In this hypothetical suit, the plaintiff does not allege that she was fired for 
religious reasons, nor could she successfully maintain such an action against 
the church.  But Title VII, like comparable state provisions, does not exempt 
religious organizations from the general prohibition against discrimination 
on the basis of race, gender, national origin, or the other protected 
characteristics under the statute. 
If there were no ministerial exception to liability under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act, the plaintiff could force the defendant to articulate a 
nondiscriminatory basis for her termination.  If the plaintiff could satisfy her 
initial burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of race or gender 
discrimination, the burden would shift to the church to articulate a 
nondiscriminatory basis for the decision.  In this example, the church likely 
would defend itself by citing the council’s conclusion that she was a poor 
preacher and deviated from settled church doctrine.  The plaintiff would 
respond by arguing that those reasons were pretextual, which she would seek 
to demonstrate by offering evidence that her preaching was adequate and that 
her prayers and teaching conformed to church doctrine. 
To resolve such a dispute, a court would inevitably be required to decide 
whether the plaintiff was an adequate preacher and whether her teaching and 
 
 8. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). 
 9. See, e.g., id. at 802–05. 
 10. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (2017) (defining unlawful discriminatory 
employment practices); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-606 (West 2017) (same).  
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012) (“This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a religious 
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of 
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such 
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”). 
 12. See generally Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
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prayers were sufficiently orthodox.  But even before Hosanna-Tabor, there 
was a long and unbroken constitutional tradition that prohibited courts from 
resolving “strictly and purely ecclesiastical” questions,13 and it is difficult to 
imagine a more purely ecclesiastical question than the quality or substance 
of a minister’s preaching and teaching.  As explained below, this is the 
strongest theoretical and constitutional justification for the ministerial 
exception.14 
But even assuming the existence of such an exception, important questions 
remain in suits by church employees against the church.  As in Hosanna-
Tabor, it may be unclear whether the employee should be treated as a minister 
for purposes of the exception.  In addition, as discussed below, some claims 
by employees properly considered ministers might warrant recovery 
notwithstanding the exception.15 
This state of affairs raises several procedural questions in suits potentially 
implicating the ministerial exception.  To return to the example, imagine that 
the plaintiff was not an ordained pastor but instead was the publicist for a 
large church congregation, responsible for designing and editing the church’s 
many publications and for maintaining the church’s elaborate website.16  It 
would not be immediately obvious whether she is a minister within the 
meaning of the exception.  If she sued for race and gender discrimination 
after being terminated and the church responded by raising the ministerial 
exception, what mechanism should the court use to decide whether the 
exception insulates the church from liability? 
This Article focuses on five important questions of procedure that can arise 
in a suit implicating the ministerial exception.  First, may the religious 
organization properly assert the exception by way of a motion to dismiss, or 
may it only raise the defense in its answer and then seek to resolve the suit 
by way of a motion for summary judgment?  Second, if the matter is not 
properly resolved at the motion to dismiss stage, should a defense based on 
the ministerial exception require the court to limit the scope of discovery to 
matters relevant to the application of the exception prior to permitting 
discovery on other issues in the suit?  Third, if the court denies a church’s 
motion based on the exception, can the church take an immediate appeal, or 
must it defer any appeal until entry of a final judgment?  Fourth, if disputed 
questions of fact concerning the plaintiff’s status as a minister cannot be 
resolved at the summary judgment stage—for example, if there is a genuine 
dispute about the actual responsibilities of the plaintiff’s position—can those 
questions be submitted to and resolved by a jury, or must they be resolved by 
the judge?  Fifth, if the defendant fails to raise the defense, either in the 
answer or later in the proceeding, may or should the court raise the ministerial 
exception sua sponte, or should the court instead treat the defense as waived? 
 
 13. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1871); see also Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. 
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445–49 (1969). 
 14. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 15. See infra Part II.E. 
 16. Cf. Alicea-Hernandez v. Archdiocese of Chi., No. 01C8374, 2002 WL 598517 (N.D. 
Ill. Apr. 18, 2002) (involving similar facts). 
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These questions must be resolved in light of the underlying justification 
for the ministerial exception.  Part I begins with the consideration of the 
exception’s origins in the lower federal courts and then addresses the Court’s 
decision in Hosanna-Tabor to identify the exception’s ultimate constitutional 
basis.  Part II then turns to the procedural questions raised by suits implicating 
the exception and weighs the benefits of each approach, proposing the 
appropriate answers to each of these questions. 
I.  THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 
This Part addresses the history of the ministerial exception as well as its 
current form.  It first describes the judicial origins of the exception and then 
analyzes the Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor, including its holding and 
justifications for the exception. 
A.  Judicial Origins of the Ministerial Exception 
By the time the Court decided Hosanna-Tabor, every federal circuit and 
many state supreme courts had recognized the ministerial exception.  In the 
first decision to apply the exception, McClure v. Salvation Army,17 the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered a gender discrimination 
claim by a female employee of the Salvation Army who had been 
terminated.18  Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act protected the 
defendant against claims of religious discrimination, it did not offer 
immunity from claims of discrimination based on membership in other 
protected classes.19  The Salvation Army argued, however, that Billie 
McClure was not an ordinary employee of the organization; instead, she was 
an ordained minister of that faith group.20  The Salvation Army argued that 
the court should read the term “employee” in Title VII to exclude ministerial 
employees.21  The court agreed and construed the statute in light of 
constitutional concerns that would arise from extending the statute to these 
circumstances.22  The court reasoned: 
The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its 
lifeblood.  The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks 
to fulfill its purpose.  Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be 
recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.  Just as the initial function of 
selecting a minister is a matter of church administration and government, 
so are the functions which accompany such a selection.  It is unavoidably 
true that these include the determination of a minister’s salary, his place of 
assignment, and the duty he is to perform in the furtherance of the religious 
mission of the church.23 
 
 17. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 18. Id. at 555. 
 19. Id. at 555–56 n.4. 
 20. Id. at 556. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 560–61. 
 23. Id. at 558–59. 
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The court’s holding was based on the “nonspecific wording”24 of the statute, 
but in identifying the relevant constitutional concerns the court cited both 
Religion Clauses.25  The bulk of its analysis, however, concentrated on a 
series of cases discussed below that focus primarily on Establishment Clause 
themes.26 
Although the Fifth Circuit addressed several issues related to the exception 
in the decade after McClure, no other circuit court expressly adopted the 
ministerial exception during that time period.  This is undoubtedly due at 
least in part to the fact that very few Protestant denominations permitted the 
ordination of women before the mid-1970s, and it took some number of years 
for women to complete seminary before entering the workplace as ministers.  
Once this development took hold, the courts were confronted with more 
claims of employment discrimination by religious employers.27 
In 1985, the Fourth Circuit recognized the ministerial exception in 
Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists.28  As in McClure, 
the court relied on both Religion Clauses in concluding that the exception 
limits liability under Title VII.29  But the case involved a complicating factor 
not present in McClure:  the plaintiff was not an ordained minister.30  Instead, 
she was an “associate in pastoral care” at a church.31  The court held, 
however, that the ministerial exception “does not depend upon ordination but 
upon the function of the position.”32  Because the plaintiff’s position was 
 
 24. Id. at 560. 
 25. Id. at 558 (describing the question presented as, “Does the application of the 
provisions of Title VII to the relationship between The Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure (a 
church and its minister) violate either of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment”); id. 
(citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Establishment Clause case)) (noting the 
“‘wall of separation’ between church and State”) ; id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963) (Free Exercise Clause case)) (noting that “[r]estrictions on the free exercise of religion 
are allowed only when it is necessary ‘to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests 
which the state may lawfully protect’” (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 639 (1943))). 
 26. Id. at 559–60 (discussing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871), Kedroff v. Saint 
Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), 
and Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969)); see also infra notes 73–114 and accompanying 
text. 
 27. Several commentators criticized the ministerial exception, in large part because of its 
effect on women’s rights in the workplace. See generally Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield 
Belongs to the Lord”:  Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to Discriminate, 21 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275 (1994); Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law?:  The 
Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1965 (2007). 
 28. 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 29. Id. at 1168 (“Any attempt by government to restrict a church’s free choice of its leaders 
thus constitutes a burden on the church’s free exercise rights.”); id. at 1169–70 (“To subject 
church employment decisions of the nature we consider today to Title VII scrutiny would also 
give rise to ‘excessive government entanglement’ with religious institutions prohibited by the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment” (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 
613 (1971))). 
 30. Id. at 1168. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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“important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church,” the court 
concluded that Rayburn performed the functions of a ministerial employee 
for purposes of the exception.33  The court emphasized the limited character 
of judicial inquiry in this context:  “While it is our duty to determine whether 
the position of associate in pastoral care is important to the spiritual mission 
of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, we may not then inquire whether the 
reason for Rayburn’s rejection had some explicit grounding in theological 
belief.”34 
Rayburn applied the ministerial exception to an employee who had not 
been ordained but whose functions were substantially similar to those 
performed by ordained ministers.  Subsequent decisions expanded even 
further the category of employees subject to the exception.  For example, in 
EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh,35 the court held that a director 
of music ministry at Sacred Heart Cathedral was a ministerial employee.36  
The plaintiff’s “primary duties at the Cathedral and its school consisted of 
the selection, presentation, and teaching of music, which is integral to the 
spiritual and pastoral mission of the Catholic Church and many other 
religious traditions.”37  Similarly, in Alicea-Hernandez v. Archdiocese of 
Chicago,38 the court applied the exception to a claim by the Archdiocese’s 
communications manager.39  The court reasoned that the plaintiff was 
responsible “for promoting the Church and spreading its message within the 
Hispanic community”40 and for acting “as a liaison between the church and 
[those] it [seeks] to reach.”41 
At the same time, courts expanded the ministerial exception to reach all 
class-based protections under Title VII (except those related to sexual 
harassment)42 and other federal employment discrimination statutes.43  
Courts have also applied the exception to bar certain state law claims, 
including defamation claims arising out of a minister’s employment by a 
 
 33. Id. at 1169. 
 34. Id. 
 35. 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 36. Id. at 802. 
 37. Id. at 797. 
 38. No. 01C8374, 2002 WL 598517 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2002). 
 39. Id. at *5. 
 40. Id. at *14. 
 41. Id. (quoting Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1340 (D. Colo. 2000), 
aff’d, 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002)). 
 42. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations:  Disputes 
Between Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 160–63 
(2009) (arguing that courts can adjudicate sexual harassment claims by ministers if “the injury 
attributable to sexual harassment can be separated from the defendants’ evaluation of her 
performance and termination of her position”); infra notes 127–30 and accompanying text. 
 43. See, e.g., Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039–40 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(applying the ministerial exception to a claim by a church music director under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act); Hutchinson v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(applying the exception to a claim by an ordained minister under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act).  
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church44 and breach of contract claims by terminated ministers.45  The courts 
in these cases reasoned that the exception applies to all claims by ministerial 
employees that would require the court to resolve specifically religious 
questions about the employee’s performance in or fitness for the position.46 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources v. Smith,47 which strictly limited claims of 
religious exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause, some commentators 
questioned whether the ministerial exception should survive.48  The D.C. 
Circuit, however, squarely held that Smith had no impact on the availability 
of the exception.49  Indeed, in EEOC v. Catholic University of America 
(Catholic University II),50 the trial court raised the ministerial exception sua 
sponte after the defendant failed to raise it as a defense to gender 
discrimination claims arising out of a tenure denial by a professor of canon 
law.51 
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hosanna-Tabor, there was 
no circuit split about the existence of the ministerial exception.52  There was, 
however, a split among the federal circuit courts, and among state courts, 
about the correct procedures for resolving cases involving the exception.  
Specifically, lower courts had divided over how to raise and resolve a defense 
based on the exception.  Some courts had concluded that the exception 
operated as a jurisdictional bar.53  On this view, the conclusion that the 
ministerial exception applied required dismissal of the suit for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Courts that followed this approach reasoned that because 
courts lack competence to decide ecclesiastical questions, they must lack 
 
 44. See, e.g., Natal v. Christian & Missionary All., 878 F.2d 1575, 1576 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(applying the ministerial exception to bar a defamation action seeking damages for an injury 
to reputation arising from discharge from a ministerial position). 
 45. See, e.g., Heard v. Johnson, 810 A.2d 871, 873 (D.C. 2002) (applying the ministerial 
exception to breach of contract and defamation claims by an ordained minister who was 
terminated by the congregation). 
 46. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 42, at 152–54 (collecting breach of contract cases); id. 
at 160–63 (collecting sexual harassment cases). 
 47. 485 U.S. 660 (1988). 
 48. See, e.g., Brant, supra note 27, at 309–10. 
 49. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am. (Catholic Univ. II), 83 F.3d 455, 469–70 (D.C. Cir. 
1996). 
 50. 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 51. Id. at 459–60. 
 52. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 
(2012). 
 53. See, e.g., Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 187–
88 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of a suit by a 
ministerial employee against a church); Alicea-Hernandez v. Archdiocese of Chi., No. 
01C8374, 2002 WL 598517, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2002); Miller v. Bay View United 
Methodist Church, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1185 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (same); see also 
Rweyemanu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction and discussing other federal appellate court decisions that had reached the 
same result).  For the theoretical underpinnings of this view, see generally Gregory A. 
Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause:  Exploring the Ministerial 
Exception, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 43 (2008) (arguing that the exception operates as a jurisdictional bar to preserve church 
autonomy). 
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power to decide cases implicating the ministerial exception.54  In those 
courts, the proper means of raising a defense based on the exception, like any 
other defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, was generally by motion 
to dismiss.55 
Other courts had held that the ministerial exception did not operate as a 
jurisdictional bar because federal district courts clearly have “authority to 
review claims arising under federal law.”56  These courts treated the 
exception as an affirmative defense to liability rather than as a bar to 
jurisdiction.57  But even these courts were divided over the correct procedure 
for raising and resolving the defense.  Some courts held that religious 
organizations could raise the exception in a motion to dismiss under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).58  Because the question whether the 
exception applied in a given case often turned on disputed factual issues, 
courts that treated the exception as an affirmative defense often permitted 
discovery before resolving the defendant’s motion.  But those courts 
disagreed further over the appropriate scope of discovery in such cases.  
Some invited the parties to engage in limited discovery focused exclusively 
on the application of the ministerial exception.59  In those courts, the parties 
typically followed this limited discovery by submitting affidavits about the 
employee’s responsibilities.60  The court would then entertain a motion for 
summary judgment by the defendant based on the exception.61  At least one 
other court treated the defense like any other affirmative defense and declined 
to limit discovery at the threshold to the question whether the employee was 
properly considered a minister.62  General discovery, including discovery on 
 
 54. See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1038–39 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 55. See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 775 
(6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]his Circuit has treated the ‘ministerial exception’ as jurisdictional in 
nature and an appropriate ground for a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).”), rev’d, 
565 U.S. 171 (2012); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(affirming granting of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Tomic, 442 
F.3d at 1038 (affirming grant of motion to dismiss). 
 56. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing cases). 
 57. Bollard v. Cal. Province of Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 58. See Petruska, 462 F.3d at 302 (“[W]e conclude that the exception does not act as a 
jurisdictional bar, but rather, is best viewed as a challenge to the sufficiency of [the plaintiff’s] 
claim under Rule 12(b)(6).”); accord Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 
F.3d 648, 654 (10th Cir. 2002); Bollard, 196 F.3d at 951; Natal v. Christian & Missionary 
All., 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989). 
 59. See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 
1165 (4th Cir. 1985); Alicea-Hernandez v. Archdiocese of Chi., No. 01C8374, 2002 WL 
598517, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2002); Alicea v. New Brunswick Theological Seminary, 608 
A.2d 218, 222–23 (N.J. 1992). 
 60. See, e.g., Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1165 (“Limited discovery focused on the nature of an 
associateship in pastoral care.”); Alicea-Hernandez, 2002 WL 598517, at *4. 
 61. Schmoll v. Chapman Univ., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426, 429 (Ct. App. 1999) (“In light of 
this uncontroverted evidence, the court granted summary judgment to Chapman, finding the 
university constitutionally protected against state interference with its employment decision 
affecting Schmoll.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Temple Emanuel of Newton v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 975 
N.E.2d 433, 435–36, 444 (Mass. 2012) (reversing a pre-Hosanna-Tabor trial court decision 
that enjoined the state equal-employment commission investigation of age discrimination 
claim by a religious school teacher). 
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the application of the exception, would proceed, and the exception would be 
simply one of many possible grounds for an eventual motion for summary 
judgment.63 
B. The Court’s Decision in Hosanna-Tabor 
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court considered both the substance and the 
procedure of the ministerial exception.  This Article considers them in turn. 
1.  Finding a Ministerial Exception 
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court embraced the ministerial exception for the 
first time.  The Court noted that the lower courts had “uniformly recognized 
the existence” of the exception to preclude adjudication of most 
discrimination claims arising out of “the employment relationship between a 
religious institution and its ministers.”64  It agreed with those courts that its 
prior decisions “confirm that it is impermissible for the government to 
contradict a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.”65 
After an extensive review of the historical and doctrinal basis for the 
exception, the Court turned to whether the plaintiff was properly considered 
a minister.  Even though she was a teacher of predominantly secular subjects 
and had only limited religious duties, the Court concluded that she counted 
as a minister for purposes of the exception.66  Although the Court expressly 
declined to announce a specific test for defining ministers,67 its conclusion 
that the plaintiff was a minister suggests that it applied a rather capacious 
definition of the role.68  In addition, eight members of the Court agreed that 
defining ministers for purposes of the exception is a task properly performed 
by courts reviewing claims within the reach of the exception.69  Those eight 
 
 63. Id. at 441 (rejecting the view that “the First Amendment requires all discovery to be 
stayed until the affirmative defense of ministerial exception is fully adjudicated”).  
 64. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 
(2012). 
 65. Id. at 185. 
 66. Id. at 190–95. 
 67. Id. at 190; see supra note 4. 
 68. The Court described Cheryl Perich’s responsibilities as follows: 
Respondent Cheryl Perich was first employed by Hosanna-Tabor as a lay teacher 
in 1999.  After Perich completed her colloquy later that school year, Hosanna-Tabor 
asked her to become a called teacher.  Perich accepted the call and received a 
diploma of vocation designating her a commissioned minister. 
Perich taught kindergarten during her first four years at Hosanna-Tabor and 
fourth grade during the 2003–2004 school year.  She taught math, language arts, 
social studies, science, gym, art, and music.  She also taught a religion class four 
days a week, led the students in prayer and devotional exercises each day, and 
attended a weekly school-wide chapel service.  Perich led the chapel service herself 
about twice a year. 
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 178.  The Court relied on several features of Perich’s position in 
concluding that she was a minister:  “the formal title given Perich by the Church, the substance 
reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the important religious functions she 
performed for the Church.” Id. at 192. 
 69. Id. at 190–95 (considering the employee’s responsibilities and determining whether 
she was properly considered a minister for purposes of the exception); id. at 204 (Alito, J., 
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Justices implicitly rejected Justice Thomas’s suggestion that the mere 
invocation of the exception by a religious organization precludes further 
judicial inquiry.70 
The Court based its recognition of the ministerial exception on both the 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.  The Court explained: 
By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise 
Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and 
mission through its appointments.  According the state the power to 
determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the 
Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such 
ecclesiastical decisions.71 
Accordingly, the Court repeatedly stated that the ministerial exception is 
“grounded in the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.”72 
A close reading of the case reveals, however, that Establishment Clause 
concerns predominate.73  Although the Court certainly identified religious 
liberty as one reason for finding a ministerial exception, the case law on 
which the decision rests, as well as the Court’s reasoning, makes clear its 
focus on the problem of governmental resolution of quintessentially religious 
questions.  The line of cases on which the Court relied stretches back to 
Watson v. Jones,74 a federal common law decision in which the Court 
required judicial deference to decisions made by the highest body within the 
Presbyterian Church.75  The dispute concerned the ownership of property of 
the Presbyterian Church in Kentucky.76  The Court, invoking a “broad and 
 
concurring) (concluding that the employee was a minister for purposes of the exception 
because she “played an important role as an instrument of her church’s religious message and 
as a leader of its worship activities”).  The Court concluded, however, that courts should not 
consider whether the religious institution’s justification for the adverse employment action 
was sincerely religious or instead pretextual. Id. at 194–95 (majority opinion).  For an 
explanation of this conclusion, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity 
in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 1265, 1279–80 (2017). 
 70. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]n my view, the 
Religion Clauses require civil courts to apply the ministerial exception and to defer to a 
religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister.”).  Justice 
Thomas reasoned that “the Religion Clauses guarantee religious organizations autonomy in 
matters of internal governance, including the selection of those who will minister the faith.  A 
religious organization’s right to choose its ministers would be hollow, however, if secular 
courts could second-guess the organization’s sincere determination that a given employee is a 
‘minister’ under the organization’s theological tenets.” Id. at 196–97.  
 71. Id. at 188–89 (majority opinion). 
 72. Id. at 190; see id. at 181 (“Both Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering 
with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.”); id. at 189 (“We cannot 
accept the remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious 
organization’s freedom to select its own ministers.”); id. at 194 (“The EEOC and Perich 
originally sought an order reinstating Perich to her former position as a called teacher.  By 
requiring the Church to accept a minister it did not want, such an order would have plainly 
violated the Church’s freedom under the Religion Clauses to select its own ministers.”). 
 73. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 69, at 1280. 
 74. 80 U.S. 679 (1871). 
 75. Id. at 733. 
 76. Id. at 727. 
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sound view of the relations of church and state under our system of laws,” 
deferred to the decision of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church 
that awarded ownership to one of the competing factions.77 
In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in 
North America,78 the Court adopted Watson’s reasoning as a matter of 
constitutional doctrine under the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses.79  
Kedroff involved a dispute between a local Russian Orthodox congregation 
in New York and the church hierarchy in Moscow over control of the Russian 
Orthodox Cathedral in New York and the appointment of church leaders in 
the United States.80  The state legislature had enacted a law that required 
every Russian Orthodox church in New York to recognize the determination 
of the governing body of the North American churches as authoritative.81  
The New York Court of Appeals relied on the law in ruling against the 
Russian Orthodox hierarchy in Moscow,82 but the U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed.83  The Court held that civil government must not usurp church 
authority to decide “strictly ecclesiastical” matters.84  Because of the 
structure of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Court ruled, such decisions 
belong to the Supreme Church Authority of the Russian Orthodox Church.85  
The Court thus invalidated the state law that purported to resolve the 
intrachurch dispute.86 
The Court reaffirmed this approach, albeit in a quite different 
denominational context, in Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church.87  Blue Hull involved 
the effort of a majority of a congregation to split from the denominational 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
 79. Id. at 115–16 (noting that the Court decided Watson “before judicial recognition of 
the coercive power of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the limitations of the First 
Amendment against state action,” but that “[f]reedom to select the clergy, where no improper 
methods of choice are proven, we think, must now be said to have federal constitutional 
protection”). 
 80. Id. at 95–97. 
 81. Id. at 97–99.  The law at issue was article 5-C of the Religious Corporations Law of 
New York: 
The purpose of the article was to bring all the New York churches, formerly subject 
to the administrative jurisdiction of the Most Sacred Governing Synod in Moscow 
or the Patriarch of Moscow, into an administratively autonomous metropolitan 
district.  That district was North American in area, created pursuant to resolutions 
adopted at a sobor held at Detroit in 1924.  This declared autonomy was made 
effective by a further legislative requirement that all the churches formerly 
administratively subject to the Moscow synod and patriarchate should for the future 
be governed by the ecclesiastical body and hierarchy of the American metropolitan 
district. 
Id. at 98–99. 
 82. See Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am. v. Kedroff, 
96 N.E.2d 56, 74 (N.Y. 1950), rev’d, 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
 83. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 119. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 115. 
 86. Id. at 120–21. 
 87. 393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
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body because of the denominational body’s liberal stances on school prayer, 
the role of women in the church, and the Vietnam War.88  At root, the conflict 
was over ownership of church property.89  The Georgia trial court held that 
the denomination had departed from traditional Presbyterian doctrine and 
therefore that the congregation had the right to claim the property upon its 
departure from the denomination.90  The Supreme Court of Georgia 
affirmed,91 but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that courts are 
not competent to decide what constitutes fidelity to the doctrines of a 
particular faith.92  The Court explained that “First Amendment values are 
plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the 
resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and 
practice.”93  Accordingly, “the First Amendment enjoins the employment of 
organs of government for essentially religious purposes” and “commands 
civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying 
controversies over religious doctrine.”94 
The Court returned to this principle in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese 
for the United States of America & Canada v. Milivojevich,95 which involved 
the efforts of the U.S.-based Bishop Milivojevich to resist the authority of the 
Belgrade-based church hierarchy.96   The hierarchy had restricted the size of 
Milivojevich’s jurisdiction.97  When he vehemently resisted, the hierarchy 
removed him from his position.98  Milivojevich filed suit in Illinois state 
court, claiming (among other things) that the church had failed to follow its 
internal procedures for removal of a bishop.99  The Illinois Supreme Court 
agreed with Milivojevich and ordered him restored to his diocese and the 
diocese restored to its original size.100  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that courts lack authority to resolve “quintessentially religious 
controversies.”101  The Court stated that when “hierarchical religious 
organizations” adjudicate disputes over internal discipline and church 
 
 88. Id. at 442 n.1. 
 89. Id. at 441–43. 
 90. Id. at 443–44 (“[T]he jury was instructed to determine whether the actions of the 
general church ‘amount[ed] to a fundamental or substantial abandonment of the original tenets 
and doctrines of the [general church], so that the new tenets and doctrines [were] utterly variant 
from the purposes for which the [general church] was founded.’” (alterations in original)). 
 91. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. E. Heights Presbyterian Church, 159 S.E.2d 690, 
701 (Ga. 1968). 
 92. Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 445–46 (stating that it is “wholly inconsistent with the 
American concept of the relationship between church and state to permit civil courts to 
determine ecclesiastical questions”). 
 93. Id. at 449. 
 94. Id. 
 95. 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
 96. Id. at 704. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 705. 
 99. Id. at 706–07. 
 100. Id. at 708; Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. of Am. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 
328 N.E.2d 268, 284 (Ill. 1975). 
 101. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 720. 
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governance, “the Constitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions 
as binding upon them.”102 
Jones v. Wolf103 also involved a dispute between competing factions over 
church property.  The Court clarified that state and federal courts are not 
always bound to defer to the hierarchy of a particular denomination in 
resolving a dispute within a religious body.  Instead, the Court held that “a 
State is constitutionally entitled to adopt neutral principles of law as a means 
of adjudicating a church property dispute.”104  By neutral principles, the 
Court meant “objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law 
familiar to lawyers and judges.”105  But the Court also imposed an important 
limit on the use of “neutral principles” to resolve intrachurch disputes:  “If in 
such a case the interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require 
the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer to 
the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical 
body.”106 
Although these cases cited the First Amendment in general rather than 
relying separately on the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise 
Clause,107 the Court’s core reasoning in each case must be based on the 
Establishment Clause.  First, in none of these cases did the Court suggest that 
a balancing of interests would be appropriate in resolving the disputes.108  In 
the middle of the twentieth century, when the Court decided Blue Hull and 
Milivojevich, such balancing was a hallmark of decision under the Free 
Exercise Clause.109  In Free Exercise Clause cases in that era, the Court 
measured the interference with religious liberty against the state’s interest in 
regulating the matter in question.110  But the Court made clear in Blue Hull 
and Milivojevich that the prohibition on adjudication of religious questions is 
 
 102. Id. at 724–25. 
 103. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
 104. Id. at 604. 
 105. Id. at 603. 
 106. Id. at 604; see also id. at 602 (“As a corollary to this commandment, the Amendment 
requires that civil courts defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the 
highest court of a hierarchical church organization.”). 
 107. See, e.g., Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 698, 709–10; Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral 
of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 100 n.5 (1952); see also Presbyterian 
Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 
450 (1969). 
 108. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 69, at 1276–77. 
 109. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (determining “whether some 
compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute 
justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendment right” under the Free 
Exercise Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (“The freedom to act 
[under the Free Exercise Clause] must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement 
of that protection.  In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining 
a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.”); id. at 307 (noting that the “State 
of Connecticut has an obvious interest in the preservation and protection of peace and good 
order within her borders” and inquiring “whether the alleged protection of the State’s interest, 
means to which end would, in the absence of limitation by the Federal Constitution, lie wholly 
within the State’s discretion, has been pressed, in this instance, to a point where it has come 
into fatal collision with the overriding interest protected by the federal compact”). 
 110. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. 
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categorical and not contingent on the relative strength of the government’s 
reason for intervention.111  In Establishment Clause cases, by contrast, the 
Court never considers whether an alleged violation of the Clause is 
outweighed by some governmental interest advanced by the challenged 
action.  Instead, the Court simply asks whether the challenged action is one 
subject to categorical prohibition. 
For example, the Court’s cases addressing prayer or religious exercises in 
public schools do not consider the state’s interest in fostering such piety.112  
The mere fact of state-sponsored religious indoctrination renders such 
conduct impermissible.  Similarly, state funding of worship or religious 
indoctrination—such as the purchase of Bibles for distribution to Christian 
congregations—would violate the Establishment Clause regardless of the 
state’s purported interest in promoting morality in the citizenry through Bible 
study.113  The same is true when the government displays quintessentially 
religious symbols with the purpose of endorsing religion.114 
Second, all of the cases cited above focused narrowly on the religious 
character of the questions presented to the lower courts.  In decisions from 
Watson through Jones, the Supreme Court held that governmental bodies, 
including courts, lack the competence to resolve strictly and purely 
ecclesiastical questions.115  Although the indirect consequence of this 
approach is a zone of freedom for churches in their decision-making, the 
Court’s primary focus was on the secular character of civil government and 
its lack of authority and capacity to resolve quintessentially religious 
disputes.  The assertion of such jurisdiction had been a hallmark of many 
colonial courts in the pre-Revolutionary era, and particularly in states with 
established churches.116  But this relationship between religious 
 
 111. See Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 449 (“[T]he First Amendment enjoins the employment of 
organs of government for essentially religious purposes . . . .”); see also Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 
at 713 (“[T]his is exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits; recognition of such 
an exception would undermine the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper 
subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of 
church tribunals as it finds them.”). 
 112. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962) (agreeing with the petitioners’ 
argument that “the State’s use of the Regents’ prayer in its public school system breaches the 
constitutional wall of separation between Church and State” because “the constitutional 
prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that in this 
country it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group 
of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government”). 
 113. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 602–03 (1971) (holding that laws that 
provided direct public funds for religious education violated the Establishment Clause). 
 114. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“When the government 
acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central 
Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the 
government’s ostensible object is to take sides.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 698 (1976); 
Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 445–49; Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox 
Church of N. Am., 363 U.S. 190, 190–91 (1960) (per curiam); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas 
Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 95 (1952); Gonzalez v. 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 17–19 (1929). 
 116. JAMES H. HUTSON, CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA:  THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES 52 
(2008). 
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organizations and the state has been soundly rejected by courts and other 
institutions of civil government since the founding era.117 
The Hosanna-Tabor Court relied squarely on the line of cases starting with 
Watson in concluding that the ministerial exception exists.118  Those cases 
stand for the proposition that certain questions are simply beyond the 
authority of secular civil government to decide.  The ministerial exception 
should be understood and applied in light of that proposition.  In other words, 
the exception does not recognize a broad autonomy for religious institutions; 
instead, it reflects only a specific limitation on the power of government to 
resolve certain ecclesiastical matters.  In this sense, the limitation is primarily 
imposed by the Establishment Clause, even if it also promotes interests 
within the scope of the Free Exercise Clause. 
Leslie Griffin has invoked Jones to suggest that the Establishment Clause 
principle does not impose a categorical limit on adjudication of religious 
questions and, specifically, employment discrimination claims by 
ministers.119  This Article contends that this is mistaken.  First, the Hosanna-
Tabor Court squarely rejected this view, and, in any event, did not even cite 
Jones.120  Second, the Jones Court’s focus on neutral principles endorses the 
view that the government lacks competence to resolve certain types of 
religious questions.121  As the Court stated in Jones, “the First Amendment 
prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of 
religious doctrine and practice.”122  Indeed, courts may decline to defer to 
church hierarchies when neutral principles are available only because such 
principles enable courts to resolve controversies without reference to church 
doctrine. 
Third, the Court in Jones was primarily concerned about property disputes, 
which often involve documents (such as deeds) and state-law presumptions 
that judges can interpret and apply without reference to religious doctrine.123  
Disputes arising out of the employment context, however, often require a 
much more nuanced judicial assessment of the employee’s conduct, which 
must be measured against the employer’s standard of proper performance.  
That standard, when applied to a ministerial employee, virtually always 
involves some question of religious fitness for the position.  As a 
 
 117. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 118. The Hosanna-Tabor Court cites and discusses Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojevich. 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 185–87 (2012). 
 119. Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 1001 (2013).  Griffin 
disagrees with those who argue that judicial inquiry into pretext by a religious employer would 
require resolution of “a theological dispute.” Id. (quoting Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 
442 F.3d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 2006)).  She also argues that such a view “ignores not only the 
courts’ regular examination of religious motivation but also their authorized use of ‘neutral 
principles of law’ to resolve church property disputes” Id.  She notes that “a court may review 
church deeds, charters, constitutional provisions, and other documents as long as it interprets 
them in purely secular terms.” Id. (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979)). 
 120. See generally Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171. 
 121. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604. 
 122. Id. at 602 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 
(1976)). 
 123. Id. at 597. 
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consequence, there generally will not be any neutral—which is to say, 
secular—principles that courts can apply to resolve such questions.  This 
probably explains why the Hosanna-Tabor Court did not bother to discuss 
Jones. 
The lower courts’ approach to the ministerial exception—both before and 
after Hosanna-Tabor—confirms that the exception derives principally from 
the Establishment Clause rather than from notions of church autonomy 
implicit in most Free Exercise Clause-based claims.  First, the courts that 
recognized the exception before the decision in Hosanna-Tabor uniformly 
relied on the line of cases holding that courts lack competence to adjudicate 
purely religious questions.124  Second, the lower courts have concluded that 
the ministerial exception does not defeat certain types of claims by ministers 
against their religious employers.125  Courts can grant relief on those claims 
because their resolution does not require determination of any ecclesiastical 
questions.126 
For example, the lower courts that have addressed the issue have uniformly 
concluded that the ministerial exception does not bar sexual harassment 
claims under Title VII.127  Those courts have reasoned that such claims do 
not require any inquiry into the minister’s fitness for the position but instead 
turn on the workplace conduct of the minister’s coworkers.128  Similarly, the 
lower courts have concluded that the ministerial exception does not bar 
certain breach-of-contract claims.129  When ministers sue after termination 
seeking to recover unpaid wages, courts typically resolve the claims and, 
when appropriate, award relief.130  Such claims do not require any judicial 
 
 124. See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 
1167–68 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Kedroff and Milivojevich); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 
F.2d 553, 559–60 (5th Cir. 1972) (citing Watson, Kedroff, and Blue Hull); see also supra note 
115. 
 125. See infra notes 127–31 and accompanying text. 
 126. See infra notes 127–31 and accompanying text. 
 127. See, e.g., Morgan v. Cent. Baptist Church of Oak Ridge, No. 3:11-CV-124-TAV-CCS, 
2013 WL 12043468, at *20 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2013); Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 
720–21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 851–52 (N.J. 2002). 
 128. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 963 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hat 
is left open . . . is a restricted, secular inquiry:  whether Elvig can carry her burden of proving 
she was sexually harassed and, if she can, whether the Church can prove its affirmative 
defense.  ‘Nothing in the character of the inquiry will require . . . evaluat[ion of] religious 
doctrine or the “reasonableness” of the religious practices followed [by the church].’  The 
reasonableness component of the . . . affirmative defense evaluates an employer’s actions in 
responding to sexual harassment rather than the motivations for that response.” (quoting 
Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 1999))); see also 
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 42, at 160–63. 
 129. See, e.g., Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 310–12 (3d Cir. 2006); Minker v. 
Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 130. See Minker, 894 F.2d at 1359 (“[A]ppellant argues that the first amendment cannot 
bar his action for breach of an oral employment contract.  We find this contention 
compelling. . . .  A church is always free to burden its activities voluntarily through contracts, 
and such contracts are fully enforceable in civil court.”) (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 
714 (1871)); see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 42, at 153–54. 
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determination of a minister’s fitness for office and accordingly are not barred 
by the exception.131 
If the ministerial exception derived principally from concerns about church 
autonomy, sexual harassment and breach-of-contract claims would likely be 
barred.  After all, resolution of such claims requires judicial inquiry into the 
relationship between a religious organization and its employees.  The cases 
concluding that the ministerial exception does not always defeat such claims 
flow naturally from the view that the exception effectuates the Establishment 
Clause principle that civil government lacks competence to resolve 
ecclesiastical questions. 
2.  Characterizing the Ministerial Exception 
While the Hosanna-Tabor Court dedicated significant attention to the 
arguments in favor of recognition of a ministerial exception, it only briefly 
addressed the procedural issues implicated by the exception in a footnote.132  
Acknowledging the divide among the lower courts, the Court announced that 
the exception does not function as a jurisdictional bar.133  Instead, the Court 
concluded that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense.134  The 
Court explained that “the issue presented by the exception is ‘whether the 
allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief,’ not whether the court has 
‘power to hear [the] case.’”135  The Court added that federal district courts 
“have power to consider [Americans with Disabilities Act] claims in cases of 
this sort, and to decide whether the claim can proceed or is instead barred by 
the ministerial exception.”136  Although the footnote is quite significant, it is 
remarkably terse given the potentially immense consequences of the 
conclusion that the exception operates as an affirmative defense. 
Some commentators have read the Hosanna-Tabor footnote implicitly to 
reinforce a broad doctrine of church autonomy,137 which they find embodied 
elsewhere in the opinion.  For example, Michael Helfand has argued that “the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor lays the groundwork for 
reconceptualizing church autonomy as a constitutionalized version of 
arbitration.”138  As discussed in greater detail below, defendants ordinarily 
waive affirmative defenses by failing (or choosing not) to raise them.139  
Helfand relies on this characteristic of affirmative defenses to argue that they 
 
 131. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 42, at 147–54. 
 132. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 195 n.4 
(2012). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010)). 
 136. Id. 
 137. For an example of an article that advances a broad view of church autonomy, see 
generally Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived:  The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-
Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183 (2014). 
 138. Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s Footnote Four:  Church Autonomy as Arbitration, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 1891, 1901 (2013). 
 139. See infra notes 259–63 and accompanying text. 
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confirm and enhance the autonomy of religious institutions.140  On this view, 
the religious organization’s choice to waive the ministerial exception (by 
declining to raise it) amounts to consent to a secular court’s binding 
resolution of a dispute with a ministerial employee.141 
Helfand understands the church property cases described above to mean 
that the members and employees of religious organizations impliedly consent 
to church adjudication of their disputes.142  He does not read those cases to 
stand for a principle of limited competence of secular courts to decide such 
disputes.143  Instead, in his view, they reflect a judgment that disputes 
between religious organizations and their members or employees will be 
resolved by secular courts only if the religious organization elects that forum 
for adjudication.144  He uses Hosanna-Tabor’s footnote four to ground this 
understanding of church autonomy: 
[O]nce we unmoor church autonomy from judicial incompetence and 
instead hitch church autonomy to the consent of the parties, Hosanna-
Tabor’s footnote four comes into focus.  If religious institutional authority 
is grounded in an implied agreement between the institution and its 
members, then surely those very same parties can employ that same consent 
mechanism to authorize courts to resolve intractable religious disputes.145 
In Helfand’s view, the choice whether to raise the ministerial exception both 
reflects and reinforces the religious institution’s autonomy. 
This Article discredits the suggestion that the ministerial exception is not 
primarily rooted in a doctrine of church autonomy under the Free Exercise 
Clause.146  In part, this is because of a disagreement with Helfand’s 
interpretation of the church property and personnel cases that the Court relied 
on in Hosanna-Tabor.  In none of those decisions did the Court suggest that 
religious communities could confer authority or competence on secular 
courts to decide purely ecclesiastical questions.  Indeed, as explained above, 
those cases stand for precisely the opposite proposition.147  Secular courts 
lack authority to decide religious questions regardless of whether the parties 
to the disputes raising those questions want courts to resolve them.148 
In addition, Helfand’s argument ultimately leads to constitutional 
difficulties in the procedures for adjudicating cases involving the ministerial 
exception.  In Helfand’s view, a religious institution can waive the exception 
 
 140. Helfand, supra note 138, at 1921–23. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1921. 
 143. Id. at 1902 (“[T]he deference and authority granted arbitrators has nothing to do with 
the incompetence of courts or an attempt to emphasize the limited nature of state power; 
arbitrators have authority because parties jointly choose to place their disputes within the 
jurisdiction of an alternative forum for resolution.”). 
 144. Id. at 1923–24. 
 145. Id. at 1923. 
 146. See supra notes 73–130 and accompanying text; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 
69, at 1296–304. 
 147. See supra notes 89–111 and accompanying text. 
 148. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 69, at 1299–301. 
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and voluntarily submit a religious dispute to the civil courts.149  As explained 
below, the underlying justification for the ministerial exception is simply 
inconsistent with this view.150 
It is not surprising that the Hosanna-Tabor footnote has prompted such 
arguments.  The Court’s analysis of the proper procedure for resolving 
assertions of the ministerial exception was not only brief but circular.  The 
Court’s justification for treating the exception as an affirmative defense 
instead of a jurisdictional bar was that the exception did not raise a question 
of courts’ “power to hear [the] case.”151  But this simply states the conclusion.  
This Article contends that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a 
particular case specifically because the court lacks power to hear it. 
Despite its circularity, the Court’s ultimate conclusion that the ministerial 
exception operates as an affirmative defense rather than as a jurisdictional 
bar is persuasive.  First, as a straightforward matter of civil procedure, federal 
courts have subject matter jurisdiction over cases arising under federal 
law.152  Claims asserted in federal court under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, or the Americans with 
Disabilities Act are claims arising under federal law even when asserted by 
employees of religious organizations.153  To be sure, when the ministerial 
exception applies such claims will ordinarily fail.  But the inability of the 
plaintiff to recover does not retroactively deprive the court of subject matter 
jurisdiction over the claims. 
Second, determining the applicability of the ministerial exception will 
usually require the resolution of threshold questions of fact.  To decide 
whether the exception applies, a court must first conclude that the employee 
in question is in fact properly deemed a minister.  As in Hosanna-Tabor, this 
inquiry will often require the resolution of disputed questions of fact, such as 
what the employee’s actual responsibilities entail.154  The court also has to 
determine whether the plaintiff’s specific claims are of the sort that implicate 
 
 149. See Helfand, supra note 138, at 1919–20. 
 150. See infra notes 267–86 and accompanying text. 
 151. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 194 n.4 
(2012) (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank. Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010)); see also 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
 152. The Hosanna-Tabor Court appears to have been concerned with suits filed in federal 
court rather than in state court.  After all, the Supreme Court does not determine the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the state courts.  As such, there is nothing to stop a state, either by 
legislative action or judicial decision, from concluding that its courts lack subject matter 
jurisdiction over cases implicating the ministerial exception.  But states lack authority to depart 
from Hosanna-Tabor in the opposite direction.  Because the ministerial exception implements 
the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, state courts cannot decide cases in which the 
exception applies. 
 153. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012); Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
 154. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 197–98 (discussing whether Cheryl Perich was 
properly considered a minister in light of her responsibilities). 
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the exception, a decision that also might turn on facts not apparent on the face 
of the complaint.155 
Questions of subject matter jurisdiction, however, should be susceptible to 
resolution at the threshold of a case.  This is true both for formal and 
prudential reasons.  Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to 
proceed.  If the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it should not entertain 
the case.  In addition, it wastes judicial resources for courts to defer resolution 
of the question of their subject matter jurisdiction until after the parties have 
spent time on discovery and other pretrial matters.  In other words, a court 
should be able to decide whether it has subject matter jurisdiction based on 
the allegations in the complaint.  To be sure, there are times when a court has 
to resolve disputed questions of fact in order to decide whether it has subject 
matter jurisdiction, such as when, in a suit not arising under federal law, there 
is a conflict over where a party is domiciled.156  But cases involving the 
ministerial exception will virtually always raise questions of fact. 
For these reasons, the Court’s conclusion that the ministerial exception 
operates as an affirmative defense is convincing.  This conception largely 
reflects the technical understanding of “jurisdictional” relationships in 
matters of civil procedure.  This conclusion, however, does not contradict the 
entire body of scholarly work that has characterized the relationship between 
civil government and religious institutions as “jurisdictional.”157  The central 
premise of that work reflects the fundamental claim that institutions of civil 
government—because of their secular character—lack competence to decide 
religious questions.  A matter can be conceptually jurisdictional, in the sense 
of competence, without it necessarily depriving the court of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, it does not follow from Hosanna-Tabor’s footnote four that 
courts should treat the ministerial exception the same way that they treat 
other, conventional affirmative defenses.  As the Court explained in 
Hosanna-Tabor, the exception applies as a matter of constitutional 
imperative, not simply as a prudential matter.158  Put more starkly, the 
Hosanna-Tabor footnote must be read in light of the fundamental 
justification for the ministerial exception.  And that exception, argued above, 
imposes a disability on civil government with respect to specific religious 
questions.159  Thus, the affirmative defense must take into account this 
constitutional disability. 
 
 155. A breach-of-contract claim by a minister against her employer seeking unpaid wages, 
for example, is not barred by the exception. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
 156. See Boustead v. Barancid, 151 F.R.D. 102, 105 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (permitting the 
plaintiffs to conduct limited discovery “on the jurisdictional issue”); S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional 
Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489, 555–57 (2010); see 
also Howard M. Wasserman, Essay, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, Adjudicative Jurisdiction, and 
the Ministerial Exemption, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 289, 314 (2012) (discussing 
“jurisdictional discovery”). 
 157. See, e.g., IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS 
PEOPLE 3–39 (2014).  
 158. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4.  
 159. See supra notes 89–111 and accompanying text. 
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For this reason, we agree only in part with Professor Wasserman’s analysis 
of Hosanna-Tabor’s footnote four.160  Wasserman argues that the Court 
properly concluded that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense 
rather than a jurisdictional bar because the exception reflects Congress’s lack 
of “prescriptive jurisdiction”161 over religious questions.162  When the 
government lacks this form of authority, it cannot prescribe any rule to 
govern the conduct at issue.  But the “nonexistence of a legal rule does not 
deprive a court of judicial jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim under appropriate 
law.”163  Instead, in Wasserman’s view, a “claim of right fails because there 
is no legal rule . . . to be enforced, which results in the failure on the merits 
of any claim brought under that purported rule.”164 
In other words, Wasserman argues that the ministerial exception exists 
because Congress lacks power to regulate certain church affairs.  In his view, 
however, courts do not lack “adjudicative jurisdiction”165 over such 
matters.166  Instead, courts must rule against the plaintiff in cases in which 
the exception applies because Congress lacked power to impose a duty on the 
church in the first place.167  This is simply another way of saying that courts 
do not lack subject matter jurisdiction to decide cases implicating the 
ministerial exception.  On this view, the problem “is not that courts are barred 
from evaluating a priest’s job performance or from ordering his 
reinstatement; it is that secular lawmaking institutions are barred from 
enacting rules that provide a legal basis for evaluation or reinstatement.”168 
As noted above, Wasserman’s contention that the ministerial exception 
does not deprive federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over cases 
implicating the exception is persuasive.169  But we disagree with his further 
suggestion that any disability the courts face in resolving such questions is 
 
 160. See Wasserman, supra note 156, at 312–316. 
 161. Id. at 298 (“Prescriptive jurisdiction is the power of secular rulemakers to prescribe 
legal rules and to regulate real-world behavior.”). 
 162. Id. at 301 (“The ministerial exemption limits the right/duty combinations that 
Congress can create between religious organizations and their ministerial employees, as well 
as the conduct that Congress, exercising its prescriptive jurisdiction, can prohibit in that 
relationship.  In other words, it is accurate to say that the First Amendment erects a 
‘jurisdictional bar,’ so long as we understand that the jurisdiction barred is Congress’s 
prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction to enact legal rules regulating some real-world 
conduct.”). 
 163. See id. at 299. 
 164. See id. at 299–300. 
 165. See id. at 302 (“[A]djudicative jurisdiction . . . is a court’s root power to adjudicate—
to hear and resolve legal and factual issues under substantive legal rules, and to provide the 
adjudicative and remedial forum to resolve claims of right.  Adjudicative jurisdiction has 
nothing to do with the ultimate success of a claim on its merits, but rather focuses solely on 
whether the court has the power to provide a forum for considering and resolving the legal and 
factual disputes under those rules in either direction.”). 
 166. Id. at 303 (“The ministerial exemption is indeed a constitutional bar on civil 
jurisdiction.  But the bar is not on the court’s civil jurisdiction to decide the case before it, but 
on Congress’s civil jurisdiction to enact legal rules regulating churches’ conduct toward 
ministerial employees.”). 
 167. See id. at 303–04.  
 168. Id. at 304. 
 169. See supra notes 161–68 and accompanying text. 
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solely the consequence of Congress’s lack of authority to prescribe the 
governing rule.170  In our view, courts face a limitation—what Wasserman 
calls an “adjudicative disability”171—for the same reason that Congress lacks 
the power to prescribe a substantive rule:  civil government is simply not 
competent to adjudicate strictly and purely ecclesiastical questions.172  When 
courts seek to resolve such matters, they impermissibly inject civil 
government into church affairs.173 
To take an example drawn from a slightly different context, a state 
legislature has prescriptive authority to regulate property, including church 
ownership of property.174  But courts nevertheless lack authority to resolve 
certain types of disputes that can arise over the ownership of that property, 
such as when competing claims to the property can be decided only by 
resolving a disputed question of church doctrine.175 
Indeed, the Kedroff case, on which the Court relied in Hosanna-Tabor, was 
in fact the culmination of an ongoing dispute over how to resolve a question 
about church property.176  In 1945, the New York legislature enacted a law 
providing “both for the incorporation and administration of Russian 
Orthodox churches.”177  The purpose of the law was to make all Russian 
Orthodox churches in New York autonomous from the Patriarch of 
Moscow.178  “This declared autonomy was made effective by a further 
legislative requirement that all the churches formerly administratively subject 
to the Moscow synod and patriarchate should for the future be governed by 
the ecclesiastical body and hierarchy of the American metropolitan 
 
 170. See Wasserman, supra note 156, at 304 (“[T]he limitation on judicial decisionmaking 
[when the ministerial exception applies] is incidental to the broader limitation on legislative 
power and on the reach and scope of the substantive law Congress can enact. . . .  [T]he judicial 
limitation arises not from an absence of core adjudicative power, but from an absence of 
existing legal rules to be applied and enforced, which in turn arises from an absence of 
prescriptive authority to enact those rules.”). 
 171. Id. at 303. 
 172. See LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 157, at 55; see also Helfand, supra note 138, at 1897 
n.34. 
 173. Wasserman concedes that “[t]he First Amendment disables all secular law and all 
secular institutions from regulating the church’s actions on matters of faith, structure, and 
membership, placing these matters entirely beyond the authority of the state.” Wasserman, 
supra note 156, at 304 (emphasis added).  But he argues that the “judiciary is implicated only 
because that is the forum in which secular legal rules are enforced.” Id.  Wasserman contends 
that courts are not prevented from evaluating ministerial job performance so much as 
lawmakers are prevented from creating rules on evaluation or reinstatement. Id. 
 174. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445 (1969) (“It is of course true that the State has a legitimate interest 
in resolving property disputes, and that a civil court is a proper forum for that resolution.  
Special problems arise, however, when these disputes implicate controversies over church 
doctrine and practice.”). 
 175. Id. at 449 (“[T]he [First] Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide 
church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious 
doctrine.”). 
 176. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 
U.S. 94, 95 (1952). 
 177. Id. at 97. 
 178. Id. at 98. 
1870 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
district.”179  The Court invalidated this law in Kedroff, reasoning that “a 
transfer by statute of control over churches” was inconsistent with both the 
“separation of church and state” and the Free Exercise Clause.180  On remand 
from the Supreme Court’s decision, the New York Court of Appeals ordered 
a retrial on an issue the New York court believed was left open.181  Relying 
on a state common law rule, the court held that control of church property 
and authority to appoint the church leadership was contingent on the 
legitimacy of those who claim to exercise that power.182  In the case of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, the court determined that control by Soviet 
authorities in Moscow deprived the Patriarch of Moscow of the deference 
ordinarily due to church hierarchy.183  Instead, the court concluded that the 
powers at issue must be vested in the local members of the denomination.184 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam decision.  In Kreshik v. 
Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of North 
America,185 the Court explained that the New York decision rested “on the 
same premises which were found to have underlain the enactment of the 
statute struck down in Kedroff.”186  The Court declared that it was of no 
moment “that the State has here acted solely through its judicial branch, for 
whether legislative or judicial, it is still the application of state power which 
we are asked to scrutinize.”187  Kreshik stands for the proposition that neither 
legislatures nor courts have authority to resolve strictly and purely 
ecclesiastical questions.188  As a consequence, courts face an adjudicative 
disability when confronted with these sorts of questions. 
The ministerial exception must be understood in light of these principles.  
Although it is an affirmative defense, the underlying justification for the 
exception requires courts to treat it differently from ordinary affirmative 
defenses.  In a typical case, after a defendant raises its affirmative defenses 
in the answer, the parties begin discovery.  Normally, the parties can seek 
discovery of any information that is relevant to the claims or defenses of any 
 
 179. Id. at 98–99. 
 180. Id. at 110. 
 181. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of N. Am. v. Kedroff, 114 
N.E.2d 197, 207 (N.Y. 1953). 
 182. Id. at 204 (“[T]here is one basic qualification to [the application of the rule of Watson 
v. Jones].  That is that the highest church authority or tribunal, whose decision is to be accorded 
final and conclusive effect, must in truth and fact be capable of functioning freely with its 
activities directed by churchmen in the interests of the church and in accordance with the 
organic law of the church.”). 
 183. Id. at 205 (“Uncritical acceptance of the principle of Watson v. Jones . . . [would 
require] the communicants of the metroplitan [sic] district to acknowledge the administrative 
rule of persons whom they believe are mere puppets of a monolithic and atheistic secular 
power, if such communicants wish to continue to use the religious temporalities they have so 
long enjoyed.”). 
 184. Id. 
 185. 363 U.S. 190 (1960) (per curiam). 
 186. Id. at 191. 
 187. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958)). 
 188. Id. at 190–91. 
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party;189 discovery is rarely limited to material relevant solely to a particular 
affirmative defense.190  After the parties complete discovery, it is common 
for one or both of the parties to move for summary judgment.191  If the court 
denies a motion for summary judgment, the decision ordinarily is not subject 
to immediate appeal;192 instead, the matter proceeds to trial, which 
(depending on the claims) might involve a jury as fact finder. 
The Court’s characterization of the ministerial exception as an affirmative 
defense, however, does not require lower courts to follow these ordinary 
procedures in cases involving the exception.  Instead, fidelity to the 
constitutional norms reflected in Hosanna-Tabor requires courts to recognize 
the distinctive status of this particular defense.  As we explain below, 
Establishment Clause limitations on the authority of courts to resolve 
religious questions requires courts to treat the ministerial exception quite 
differently from ordinary affirmative defenses.193 
The Court has followed a similar approach with qualified immunity.194  
Government officials enjoy a qualified immunity from suit for their official 
conduct provided that their conduct did not violate clearly established law.195  
The Court has described the defense as “an immunity from suit rather than a 
mere defense to liability”196 that courts should seek to resolve “at the earliest 
possible stage in litigation.”197  The Court nevertheless has held that qualified 
immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by the government 
official, rather than a jurisdictional bar.198  Because of the distinctive 
character of the defense, however, the Court has made clear that the ordinary 
rules governing the assertion and adjudication of affirmative defenses do not 
 
 189. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of 
discovery is as follows:  Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that 
is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . .”); id. r. 26(d)(3)(B) (“Unless the parties 
stipulate or the court orders otherwise for the parties’ and witnesses’ convenience and in the 
interests of justice . . . discovery by one party does not require any other party to delay its 
discovery.”).  
 190. See supra note 189.  But see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(B) (providing that the parties 
should confer to propose a discovery plan that states “whether discovery should be conducted 
in phases or be limited to or focused on particular issues”). 
 191. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b) (“Unless a different time is set by local rule or the court 
orders otherwise, a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days 
after the close of all discovery.”). 
 192. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .”). 
 193. See infra notes 228–31, 248–51 and accompanying text. 
 194. See Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th Cir. 
2002) (comparing the ministerial exception to qualified immunity). 
 195. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (stating that qualified immunity 
protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known”). 
 196. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
 197. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991); accord Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 198. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (“[T]his Court has never indicated that 
qualified immunity is relevant to the existence of the plaintiff’s cause of action; instead we 
have described it as a defense available to the official in question.  Since qualified immunity 
is a defense, the burden of pleading it rests with the defendant.” (citations omitted)). 
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always apply to qualified immunity.199  For example, although a government 
official can waive the defense by failing to raise it, courts often allow 
defendants to raise the defense at later stages of the litigation than an ordinary 
affirmative defense.200  In addition, denials of motions for summary 
judgment by government officials on grounds of qualified immunity are 
immediately appealable, notwithstanding the ordinary rule against 
interlocutory appeals.201 
The Court has made clear that these special rules apply because of the 
underlying justification for the defense, which is to ensure that government 
officials are not unduly inhibited in carrying out their duties by the fear of 
civil liability.202  In this respect, it closely resembles the ministerial 
exception.  Both are affirmative defenses in the formal sense, yet they owe 
their existence to more fundamental legal principles that themselves reflect 
limits—prudential or constitutional—on the power of courts. 
II.  THE PROCEDURE OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 
In our view, courts should be sensitive in overseeing litigation that 
potentially involves the ministerial exception.  Because the Hosanna-Tabor 
Court gave only cursory treatment of the procedural issues raised by the 
exception, lower courts lack guidance about how to proceed.  In particular, 
the Court failed to address the questions most likely to arise in suits 
implicating the ministerial exception.  First, should the religious organization 
assert the exception by way of a motion to dismiss or may it only raise the 
defense in its answer and then seek to resolve the suit by way of a motion for 
summary judgment?  Second, if the matter is not properly resolved at the 
motion to dismiss stage, should the court limit the scope and order of 
discovery to resolve the application of the exception prior to discovery on 
other issues in the suit?  Third, if the court denies a church’s motion based 
on the exception, can the church take an immediate appeal?  Fourth, if 
disputed questions of fact concerning the plaintiff’s status as a minister 
cannot be resolved at the summary judgment stage, can those questions be 
submitted to and resolved by a jury?  Fifth, if the defendant fails to raise the 
defense, may, or should, the court raise the ministerial exception sua sponte, 
or should the court instead treat the defense as waived?  This Part addresses 
these questions in turn. 
 
 199. See infra notes 200–01. 
 200. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 634 F.3d 906, 913–14 (7th Cir. 
2011); Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638, 639 (9th Cir. 1993); Quezada v. County of 
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 201. See generally Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996); Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511. 
 202. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816 (explaining that qualified immunity protects against “the 
general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial—distraction of officials from their 
governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from 
public service”). 
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A.  Raising the Defense 
First, does the religious organization properly assert the ministerial 
exception by way of a motion to dismiss, or may it only raise the defense in 
its answer and then seek to resolve the suit by way of a motion for summary 
judgment?  If nothing else, it is clear from footnote four in Hosanna-Tabor 
that a court should not grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction based on the ministerial exception.203  This 
follows from the Court’s conclusion that the exception does not operate as a 
jurisdictional bar.204  A court is not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction 
simply because the case involves a claim asserted by a ministerial employee 
against that person’s religious employer.  Indeed, even in cases in which the 
court concludes that the exception is a complete defense against the claim, 
the court, as a technical matter, does not lack subject matter jurisdiction.205  
Instead, in such a case, the appropriate disposition is a judgment on the merits 
in favor of the religious organization.206 
Ordinarily, affirmative defenses are pleaded in the answer and then 
resolved by a motion for summary judgment after discovery.207  That said, in 
some rare cases, a court may be able to grant a religious organization’s 
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure 
to state a claim because of the application of the ministerial exception.  For 
example, if the plaintiff sues for age discrimination and specifically alleges 
in the complaint that he is a minister with pastoral responsibilities in the 
church, a court likely can grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  
Even assuming that all of the plaintiff’s allegations about discrimination are 
true, the plaintiff cannot recover because of the ministerial exception.  To be 
sure, as a technical matter, the proper approach might be for the defendant to 
file an answer raising the exception and then to move for judgment on the 
pleadings under Rule 12(c).208  But for present purposes, the point is that the 
court may resolve such a case at the threshold without the need for 
discovery.209 
 
 203. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 195 
n.4 (2012). 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Wasserman, supra note 156, at 316–17. 
 206. See id. at 307 (“The point is that no statutory rule exists as law subjecting the church-
operated school for this employment decision affecting this employee. . . .  [A] civil action to 
enforce such a non-existent rule fails, a failure on the merits under any of our definitions.”). 
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state any avoidance or affirmative defense . . . .”); id. r. 56(a) (“A party may move for 
summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—
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 208. See id. r. 12(c) (“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—
a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”).  At least one court has addressed (but 
denied) a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the ministerial exception since 
Hosanna-Tabor. See Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1173 
(N.D. Ind. 2014). 
 209. The ministerial exception is not unique in this regard.  Similar questions arise in cases 
in which the allegations in the complaint make clear that the statute of limitations has run.  
Courts often grant motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) in such cases, even though, strictly 
speaking, they probably ought to be resolved by motions for judgment on the pleadings under 
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In the ordinary run of cases, the ministerial exception will be resolved by 
a motion for summary judgment.  The Hosanna-Tabor Court made clear that 
the exception does not apply to all employees of religious organizations; 
instead, it applies only in cases in which the plaintiff is properly considered 
a minister.210  In addition, although the Hosanna-Tabor Court did not address 
the question whether all claims by ministerial employees are subject to the 
exception, many lower courts have held that the exception does not apply to 
certain claims by ministerial employees—including some arising under 
employment discrimination laws.211  As noted above, courts have regularly 
concluded that, notwithstanding the exception, they may resolve claims by 
ministerial employees of sexual harassment against their religious 
employers.212  Other types of claims—including those for breach of contract 
for unpaid wages—are also outside the scope of the ministerial exception.213 
As a consequence, any case in which a religious organization raises the 
ministerial exception requires a court to resolve at least two questions:  first, 
whether the plaintiff is a ministerial employee; and second, whether the 
plaintiff’s claim is within the scope of the exception.  The resolution of these 
questions almost invariably requires assessment of the facts at issue in the 
dispute.  To determine whether the plaintiff is a ministerial employee, the 
court must consider the employee’s “formal title,” “the substance reflected in 
that title,” the employee’s “own use of that title,” and “the important religious 
functions” that the employee performed for the religious organization.214  
The parties in these controversies, as in Hosanna-Tabor itself, often offer 
conflicting evidence about these matters.215 
Similarly, whether the plaintiff’s claim is the type to which the ministerial 
exception applies will sometimes require the resolution of disputed factual 
questions.  For example, imagine that the plaintiff enters a two-year contract 
to perform ministerial services for a religious organization.  After the 
 
Rule 12(c).  This is because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that a defendant 
waives by failing to raise.  The question of waiver in the context of the ministerial exception 
is addressed below. See infra notes 259–86.  As such, the defendant must assert the defense in 
order to rely on it as a basis for judgment.  Accordingly, courts should grant motions resolving 
cases on the ground that they are barred by the statute of limitations only once the defendant 
has had an opportunity to assert the defense in the answer. See Von Saher v. Norton Simon 
Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that a court may 
dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that it is barred by a statute of limitations 
only when “the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint”); Young v. 
Spokane County, No. 14-CV-98-RMP, 2014 WL 2893260, at *1 (E.D. Wash. June 25, 2014) 
(considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on statute of limitations).  
 210. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 
(2012) (“Having concluded that there is a ministerial exception grounded in the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment, we consider whether the exception applies in this case.”); id. 
at 191–95 (determining whether the plaintiff, an employee of a religious organization, was 
properly considered a minister). 
 211. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
 214. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192. 
 215. Id. at 190–95; see also Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, 777 F.3d 
829, 834–35 (6th Cir. 2015). 
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organization fires him within that two-year period, he files suit for breach of 
contract.  The religious organization defends itself by relying on a clause in 
the contract that allowed termination for “good cause.”  On a motion for 
summary judgment, the court must resolve whether the good cause defense 
implicates an ecclesiastical question.216  If the defendant claims that good 
cause existed because the plaintiff’s sermons deviated from church doctrine, 
then the ministerial exception will apply.  If the defendant claims that good 
cause existed for other reasons, then the exception might not apply.217 
The Hosanna-Tabor Court elucidated that courts must resolve the 
threshold question whether the plaintiff is a minister.218  The Court rejected 
Justice Thomas’s view, which he expressed in a concurring opinion, that 
courts must accept, without further inquiry, a sincere assertion of the defense 
by a religious organization.219  Accordingly, the Hosanna-Tabor Court 
recognized that cases implicating the ministerial exception will often involve 
disputed questions of fact.220  As a consequence, a motion for summary 
judgment will ordinarily be the appropriate mechanism for resolving an 
assertion of the ministerial exception. 
There are two ways that the defendant might present a motion for summary 
judgment based on the exception.  First, a religious organization might file a 
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and support 
the motion by appending additional materials to demonstrate the application 
of the exception.  In such cases, the court should convert the motion to a 
motion for summary judgment under Rule 12(d).221  Second, the parties 
might conduct discovery, and the defendant might then file a motion for 
 
 216. See generally Leavy v. Congregation Beth Shalom, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (N.D. Iowa 
2007); Jay v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 531 S.E.2d 369 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); 
Gates v. Catholic Archdiocese of Seattle, 10 P.3d 435 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); see also Dobrota 
v. Free Serbian Orthodox Church, 952 P.2d 1190 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998). 
 217. Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1359 
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (“A church is always free to burden its activities voluntarily through contract, 
and such contracts are fully enforceable in civil court.”); see also Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 
462 F.3d 294, 310 (3rd Cir. 2006).  See generally Elmora Hebrew Ctr., Inc. v. Fishman, 593 
A.2d 725 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1991). 
 218. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 181. 
 219. Id. at 196 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]n my view, the Religion Clauses require civil 
courts to apply the ministerial exception and to defer to a religious organization’s good-faith 
understanding of who qualifies as its minister.”). 
 220. Because the plaintiff in Hosanna-Tabor asserted the type of claim that plainly is 
covered by the exception, the Court had no occasion to address the application of the 
ministerial exception to other types of claims, such as breach of contract. Id. at 196 (majority 
opinion) (“The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a 
minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire her.  Today we hold only that the ministerial 
exception bars such a suit.  We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of 
suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their 
religious employers.”).  As noted above, however, resolving this question of scope will often 
require courts to decide factual disputes. See supra notes 209–15 and accompanying text. 
 221. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside 
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as 
one for summary judgment under Rule 56.  All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity 
to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.”).  Some courts have taken this 
approach since Hosanna-Tabor. See, e.g., Davis v. Balt. Hebrew Congregation, 985 F. Supp. 
2d 701, 711 (D. Md. 2013). 
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summary judgment under Rule 56(a).  After Hosanna-Tabor, because the 
application of the exception is not a jurisdictional bar, summary judgment 
will almost invariably be the appropriate mechanism for deciding whether 
the exception applies.222 
B.  The Scope of Discovery 
This conclusion raises our second question:  if a case implicating the 
ministerial exception is not resolved by a motion to dismiss, should courts 
limit the scope and order of discovery to the application of the exception 
before permitting discovery on other issues in the suit?  Ordinarily, once 
discovery begins, the parties presumptively are free to conduct discovery on 
anything within the scope of discovery—that is, any matter that is “relevant 
to any party’s claim or defense.”223  In cases involving the ministerial 
exception, however, courts should invoke their discretion to manage the 
proceedings to limit discovery to the matters relevant to the application of the 
exception.224 
Those who defend the ministerial exception often argue for a quick 
resolution of the issue in order to avoid burdening religious organizations 
with the cost of discovery.225  They note that the practical implications for a 
religious organization of having to litigate a ministerial exception claim all 
the way through full discovery are significant.226  Not only must churches 
bear the ordinary costs of defending the suit, but in ordinary discovery their 
leaders can be examined on questions of church doctrine, their 
congregations’ consistency with church doctrine, and countless other matters 
that might chill a religious institution’s articulation of its own faith if it knows 
that it might face discovery.227 
This justification for narrowing the scope of discovery, standing alone, is 
not particularly persuasive.  To be sure, discovery can be costly, intrusive, 
and time consuming, but this is true for all defendants in civil litigation who 
seek to resolve the suit on the basis of some threshold defense.  Instead, any 
argument in favor of limiting preliminary discovery to matters relevant to one 
particular defense must arise out of the ultimate justification for that defense. 
 
 222. See, e.g., Puri v. Khalsa, 844 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing appropriate 
procedures for adjudicating assertions of the ministerial exception); see also Fratello v. Roman 
Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y., 175 F. Supp. 3d 152, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 223. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).  This is confirmed by Rule 16, which empowers the court to 
issue a scheduling order to “modify the extent of discovery.” Id. r. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii).  Absent 
such an order, the parties presumptively may seek discovery on any relevant issue in the suit. 
 224. See id. r. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii).  Matters relevant to the application of the ministerial 
exception include both information about whether the plaintiff is a ministerial employee and 
information about whether the claim is of the type subject to the exception. 
 225. See Mark E. Chopko & Marissa Parker, Still a Threshold Question:  Refining the 
Ministerial Exception Post-Hosanna Tabor, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 233, 293–94, 297–300 
(2012). 
 226. Id. at 274–75, 282–83, 292–93. 
 227. See, e.g., id. at 290 n.338 (“[T]he Court’s decision to treat the ministerial exception as 
an affirmative defense still leaves defendants at a risk of the increased time and expense 
associated with summary judgment.”). 
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Other defenders of the ministerial exception have argued that courts should 
limit discovery to the application of the exception because any broader 
discovery threatens the principle of church autonomy.228  This argument 
relies primarily on the Free Exercise Clause and specifically on the claim that 
the Clause insulates religious organizations from government interference in 
their internal decision-making.229  But this argument proves too much.  Not 
every “internal” decision made by a religious institution is protected from 
scrutiny by courts or other organs of civil government.  For example, a court 
may intervene if a congregation decides not to pay a minister after the 
minister has performed her required duties under a contract with the 
church.230 
The Hosanna-Tabor Court ultimately recognized a ministerial exception 
because of Establishment Clause concerns about the impropriety of civil 
government intruding into or resolving questions about the fitness of a person 
for employment as a minister.231  If courts do not impose limits on the scope 
of discovery in a suit in which the defendant religious organization has 
asserted the ministerial exception, then the plaintiff will be free to seek 
discovery of information that proves her fitness for the position.  For 
example, a plaintiff unconstrained by an order narrowing the scope of 
discovery might seek to depose congregants about the quality of her sermons 
or the orthodoxy of her teaching.  But the mere discovery of such information 
could well provoke disputes or discord within the congregation, and the 
“facts” discovered are certainly ones that no court could properly find.  In 
other words, the disruption of life within the religious community would 
promote no legitimate governmental interests. 
To be sure, if the court concludes that the ministerial exception does not 
apply—either because the plaintiff is not a minister within the meaning of the 
exception or because the claim is not one to which the exception applies—
then it may permit discovery on other issues implicated by the claims in the 
suit.  At that point, the religious organization cannot simply rely on a claim 
of autonomy or the need to avoid internal discord as a way of resisting 
discovery.  But courts should not unnecessarily authorize discovery that 
might turn out to be moot because of the application of the ministerial 
exception. 
 
 228. See, e.g., id. at 235 (“This article advocates that the application of the ministerial 
exception as a threshold legal determination is necessary to preserve foundational religious 
rights . . . .”); id. at 293 (“[D]iscovery should be directed towards answering questions that 
would highlight the clash of principles present in these cases, and should not encompass the 
entire merits of the claim or all of the other various issues that might be implicated in the case.  
Discovery, like other litigation expenses, compounds the injury that attends the invasion of 
this constitutionally protected turf.”). 
 229. See id. at 250–69; Kalscheur, supra note 53, at 55–63; Lund, supra note 137, at 1196–
1201. 
 230. See, e.g., Heard v. Johnson, 810 A.2d 871, 886–87 (D.C. 2002) (applying the 
ministerial exception to breach of contract and defamation claims by an ordained minister who 
was terminated by the congregation); see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 42, at 152–54. 
 231. See supra notes 73–130 and accompanying text. 
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Accordingly, if a religious organization is a defendant and raises the 
ministerial exception in a motion for summary judgment, trial courts should 
exercise their discretion to “modify the extent of discovery” by initially 
limiting discovery only to facts relevant to the ministerial exception.232  This 
approach is typical in cases involving qualified immunity,233 which (as noted 
above) is an atypical affirmative defense similar in many ways to the 
ministerial exception.234 
C.  Interlocutory Appeals 
Another question likely to arise in this sort of litigation is whether a 
religious organization can take an immediate appeal from a court’s denial of 
its motion for summary judgment based on the ministerial exception.  The 
ordinary rule in federal court is that denials of motions for summary judgment 
are not subject to interlocutory appeal; instead, parties must wait for a final 
judgment before filing a notice of appeal.235  The rules governing 
interlocutory appeals vary from state to state, with some jurisdictions 
following the federal approach and others authorizing immediate appeals for 
certain types of issues or trial court decisions.236 
There are several exceptions to the final-judgment rule in federal court, but 
the Supreme Court has construed them very narrowly.237  The exception most 
 
 232. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii).  At least three federal district courts have taken this 
approach since Hosanna-Tabor. See Collette v. Archdiocese of Chi., 200 F. Supp. 3d. 730, 
735 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“To help focus the discovery to be taken in this phase, the Court notes 
that the scope of the issue subject to discovery is narrow.  As there is no dispute that 
Defendants are religious institutions, the only remaining question is whether Collette’s 
employment with them was ministerial.”); Fratello v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y., 
175 F. Supp. 3d 152, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“In a bench ruling, I found that I could not 
determine whether the ministerial exception applied at the motion to dismiss stage because of 
the necessarily fact-intensive inquiry that exception necessitates, and because Plaintiff had 
plausibly alleged that she was not a minister, and had no religious training, duties or functions; 
that others handled all religiously related activities; and that she was simply a secular 
administrator doing what a public-school principal would do.  I therefore directed the parties 
to engage in limited discovery on the issue.” (citations omitted)); Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran 
Church, 884 F. Supp. 2d 668, 671 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“The Court allowed limited discovery to 
determine whether the ministerial exception applies.”). 
 233. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 599–600 (1998) (“Of course, the judge should 
give priority to discovery concerning issues that bear upon the qualified immunity defense, 
such as the actions that the official actually took, since that defense should be resolved as early 
as possible.”); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) (“[Q]ualified immunity 
questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of a litigation. . . .  [I]f the actions 
[defendant] claims he took are different from those the [plaintiffs] allege (and are actions that 
a reasonable officer could have believed lawful), then discovery may be necessary before [the 
defendant’s] motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds can be resolved.  
Of course, any such discovery should be tailored specifically to the question of [the 
defendant’s] qualified immunity.” (citations omitted)). 
 234. See supra notes 193–200 and accompanying text. 
 235. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012). 
 236. Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5701 (MCKINNEY 1999) (permitting interlocutory appeals as 
of right for some nonfinal orders), with N.J. CT. R. 2:5-6 (permitting interlocutory appeals only 
on application to the appellate court and granted only in the appellate court’s discretion). 
 237. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744–46 (1976) (discussing 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a)–(b)). 
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likely to apply to the denial of motions for summary judgment in disputes 
over ministerial employment is the collateral-order doctrine.238  Under that 
doctrine, appeal before a final judgment is available for “district court 
decisions that are conclusive, that resolve important questions completely 
separate from the merits, and that would render such important questions 
effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the underlying 
action.”239 
The mere fact that a trial court order resolves a matter that is jurisdictional 
in character is not sufficient to warrant immediate appeal under the doctrine.  
For example, district court decisions denying motions to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction do not fall within the scope of the collateral-order 
doctrine.240  Nor does the fact that an order requires the disclosure of 
especially sensitive information render it amenable to immediate appeal.  The 
most prominent example of this is the Court’s conclusion that orders rejecting 
claims of attorney-client privilege are not immediately appealable collateral 
orders.241  The Court’s reasoning in concluding that such orders are not 
subject to immediate appeal almost certainly applies to orders rejecting 
claims of priest-penitent privilege, as well.242 
At first blush, denials of motions for summary judgment based on the 
ministerial exception seem like poor candidates for immediate appeal.  First, 
the Court expressly concluded in Hosanna-Tabor that the doctrine does not 
 
 238. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
 239. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994). 
 240. Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 501 (1989) (holding that a claimed right 
to be sued in a particular forum based on a forum-selection clause is “surely as effectively 
vindicable as a claim that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant—and 
hence does not fall within the third prong of the collateral order doctrine”); Turi v. Main St. 
Adoption Servs., LLP, 633 F.3d 496, 502 (6th Cir. 2011) (“A claim that the trial court lacks 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant can be vindicated on appeal after trial, and thus does 
not satisfy the third prong of the collateral-order doctrine.” (citations omitted)). 
 241. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103 (2009) (holding that 
“disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege” do not “qualify for immediate 
appeal under the collateral order doctrine”). 
 242. The Court acknowledged that the attorney-client privilege serves “broader public 
interests,” but it explained that courts “routinely require litigants to wait until after final 
judgment to vindicate valuable rights, including rights central to our adversarial system.” Id. 
at 108–09.  It reasoned that “postjudgment appeals generally suffice to protect the rights of 
litigants and ensure the vitality of the attorney-client privilege” because “[a]ppellate courts 
can remedy the improper disclosure of privileged material in the same way they remedy a host 
of other erroneous evidentiary rulings:  by vacating an adverse judgment and remanding for a 
new trial in which the protected material and its fruits are excluded from evidence.” Id. at 109.  
The Court also recognized that “an order to disclose privileged information intrudes on the 
confidentiality of attorney-client communications,” but it asserted that “deferring review until 
final judgment does not meaningfully reduce the ex ante incentives for full and frank 
consultations between clients and counsel.” Id.  Finally, the Court explained that “established 
mechanisms for appellate review”—such as certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or 
defying a discovery order and appealing a contempt determination—“not only provide 
assurances to clients and counsel about the security of their confidential communications; they 
also go a long way toward addressing [the] concern that, absent collateral order appeals of 
adverse attorney-client privilege rulings, some litigants may experience severe hardship.” Id. 
at 112.  Even though “an order to disclose privileged material may, in some situations, have 
implications beyond the case at hand, the same can be said about many categories of pretrial 
discovery orders for which collateral order appeals are unavailable.” Id.  
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serve as a jurisdictional bar,243 and not even determinations adverse to 
jurisdictional defenses ordinarily are immediately appealable.244  Second, the 
mere fact that litigation of claims in such suits might implicate sensitive 
church matters alone is not sufficient to qualify.245 
To be sure, religious organizations have contended that denials of motions 
based on the ministerial exception should be immediately appealable because 
of the force of the Free Exercise Clause.  Proponents of this view have argued 
that, in cases in which the trial court errs in rejecting the ministerial 
exception, forcing the church to litigate impermissibly intrudes on church 
autonomy by exposing internal church decision-making to public scrutiny.246  
But such claims, like claims about the sensitivity of attorney-client 
communications, are likely insufficient for immediate appeal. 
A stronger argument for immediate appeal of denials of motions for 
summary judgment based on the ministerial exception can be grounded in an 
analogy to the doctrine of qualified immunity.  Qualified immunity shields 
government officials from liability for acts within the scope of their 
employment if those acts were not inconsistent with clearly established law 
at the time of the violation.247  The Court has held that denials of motions for 
summary judgment based on qualified immunity are immediately appealable 
under the collateral-order doctrine.248 The Court has reasoned that qualified 
immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; 
and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously 
permitted to go to trial.”249  Accordingly, a decision denying qualified 
immunity is “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”250 
Although the Court concluded in Hosanna-Tabor that the ministerial 
exception is an affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional bar, it 
nevertheless made clear that the exception is best understood as an 
effectuation of the Establishment Clause’s limits on governmental authority 
 
 243. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 195 
n.4 (2012). 
 244. See generally Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. 495. 
 245. At least one federal court of appeals has taken this approach since Hosanna-Tabor. 
See Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc., 772 F.3d 1085, 1090 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(“[A]lthough the statutory and constitutional rights asserted in defense of this suit are 
undoubtedly important, the Diocese has not established that the Title VII exemptions or the 
First Amendment more generally provides an immunity from trial, as opposed to an ordinary 
defense to liability.”).  As explained below, we think this approach is mistaken.  But see 
McCarthy v. Fuller, 714 F.3d 971, 972 (7th Cir. 2013) (permitting interlocutory appeal to 
prevent adjudication of a nun’s standing within the church). 
 246. See Chopko & Parker, supra note 227, at 293 (“[T]he judicial process employed to 
resolve this threshold legal question should focus on:  (1) producing a narrow decision as to 
whether the ministerial exception applies or not, and (2) allowing a prompt appeal of a negative 
decision so as not to force the religious body through years of expensive litigation, 
simultaneously wearing down its resources and its will to stand on principle.”). 
 247. See supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text. 
 248. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526–27 (1985); supra notes 194–202 and 
accompanying text. 
 249. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. 
 250. Id. at 527. 
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to decide strictly and purely ecclesiastical matters.251  On this view, civil 
courts lack competence to resolve questions about a person’s fitness to serve 
as a ministerial employee.  So understood, the exception is an affirmative 
defense only because not all assertions by churches that the plaintiff is a 
ministerial employee must be accepted by a court and because courts can 
entertain some of the types of claims asserted by ministers against their 
religious employers.  But the practical necessity of resolving these factual 
predicates does not change the exception’s essential character as an 
Establishment Clause limitation on the competence of governmental bodies 
to resolve certain religious questions.252 
As such, the ministerial exception closely resembles qualified immunity 
for purposes of the collateral-order doctrine.  If a trial court denies a motion 
for summary judgment invoking the ministerial exception, but the trial court 
turns out to have erred in that conclusion, the absence of an avenue for 
immediate appeal will require the court not only to permit discovery about, 
but to resolve, quintessentially religious questions.  But the Establishment 
Clause limits the power of the government not only to issue and enforce a 
binding judgment on such matters but also merely to entertain such 
questions.253 
Unlike qualified immunity, however, the fundamental value of the 
ministerial exception would not be entirely lost by waiting for a final 
judgment before permitting an appeal.  An appellate court can reverse a 
judgment that is inconsistent with a proper understanding of the ministerial 
exception and thus relieve the religious organization of improperly assigned 
liability.  In this sense, a decision denying summary judgment based on the 
ministerial exception is not effectively unreviewable after a final judgment.  
That is, the ministerial exception, at bottom, is still a defense to liability rather 
than a comprehensive immunity from suit.  But nonetheless, application of 
the collateral-order doctrine in this context would better guard against 
Establishment Clause violations by trial courts than would the standard 
requirement of a final judgment before appeal. 
D.  The Appropriate Finder of Disputed Facts 
Although it is unusual, sometimes disputed questions of fact concerning 
the plaintiff’s status as a minister cannot be resolved at the summary 
judgment stage.  For example, imagine that the plaintiff, a church organist, 
sues the church alleging that he was fired because of his age and replaced 
with a younger musician.254  The church raises the ministerial exception and 
offers deposition testimony stating that the plaintiff often selected music that 
 
 251. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188–89 
(2012). 
 252. Id. 
 253. See, e.g., Jae-Woo Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church of Wash., 553 S.E.2d 511, 
513–15 (Va. 2001). 
 254. Cf. Archdiocese of Wash. v. Moersen, 925 A.2d 659, 677 (Md. 2007) (holding that 
the ministerial exception did not apply to a church organist). 
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was used during worship.255  The plaintiff responds with evidence that the 
pastor always selected the hymns and other liturgical music and that the 
plaintiff’s responsibilities were limited to simply performing the music 
selected for him.256  In light of the other undisputed evidence about the 
plaintiff’s responsibilities, the ministerial exception would apply only if the 
plaintiff had a role in selecting hymns and therefore in planning or leading 
worship.  If there is a genuine dispute about this material fact, a court cannot 
resolve the church’s motion for summary judgment based on the ministerial 
exception.  This does not mean, however, that the exception cannot apply; it 
simply means that the facts necessary to determining its application are in 
dispute.  Ordinarily, when a court denies a motion for summary judgment on 
the ground that the facts remain in dispute, the matter proceeds to trial.  The 
same is true in cases implicating the ministerial exception. 
There is little doubt that juries are competent to resolve disputed facts in 
employment discrimination cases.  The question remains, however, whether 
a jury is competent to resolve the disputed facts necessary to establish 
whether the plaintiff is a ministerial employee.  We do not believe that there 
is a clear or categorical answer to this question.  Given the conventional role 
of juries in resolving disputed factual matters,257 courts should prevent juries 
from resolving factual predicates to the ministerial exception only on a 
showing that jury participation would be inconsistent with the underlying 
justification for the exception.  We do not perceive any reason why this 
should be categorically true.  Instead, withdrawal of the question from a jury 
should occur only in extraordinary circumstances.  For example, if the 
defendant is a house of worship of a minority faith in the surrounding 
community, it is possible that jury bias will affect the jury’s resolution of the 
disputed factual questions.258  In addition, courts can use carefully 
constructed jury instructions or special verdict forms to alleviate any 
lingering concerns about jury competence to resolve such questions. 
E.  Waivability 
The final procedural issue that could arise in litigation between a religious 
institution and one of its employees is whether the ministerial exception is 
waivable.  If the defendant fails to raise the defense, either in the answer or 
later in the proceeding, may, or should, the court raise the ministerial 
exception sua sponte, or should the court instead treat the defense as waived?  
The ordinary rule is that a defendant waives an affirmative defense if it fails 
 
 255. Id. at 666. 
 256. Id. at 666–67. 
 257. Of course, there will be a jury trial only in those cases in which at least one of the 
parties has demanded a jury. See FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b) (“On any issue triable of right by a jury, 
a party may demand a jury trial by . . . serving the other parties with a written demand—which 
may be included in a pleading—no later than 14 days after the last pleading directed to the 
issue is served . . . .”). 
 258. Cf. Chopko & Parker, supra note 227, at 248 (arguing that a juror’s “preconceived 
notions of religion and religious issues may obscure the resolution of a case”). 
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to raise it at a sufficiently early point in the litigation.259  In our adversarial 
system, it typically is not the role or province of the court to raise defenses 
or arguments on behalf of the parties. 
There are exceptions to this general rule.  For example, a party who fails 
to object to a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction at the threshold of the 
suit does not waive it. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) specifically 
provides that “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter 
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”260  But subject matter 
jurisdiction is unusual in this respect.  Most defenses are waived by the failure 
to raise them at the earliest possible opportunity.  Threshold defenses, such 
as lack of personal jurisdiction or improper venue, must be asserted in a 
preanswer motion to dismiss or in the answer, with minimal opportunity for 
amendment.261  Other affirmative defenses must be raised in the answer, and 
although courts are more generous in permitting amendment at later stages 
of the proceeding,262 they ordinarily will not raise them sua sponte.263 
Given this set of background rules, there is a strong argument that courts 
should raise sua sponte only those defenses that are similar in character to the 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  A defendant’s failure to raise all other 
defenses, on this view, should result in waiver.  As we explained above, the 
Hosanna-Tabor Court explicitly concluded that the ministerial exception is 
an affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional bar.264  Accordingly, there 
is a surface appeal to the view that a party’s failure to raise the exception 
should result in waiver, and a court should not raise it sua sponte. 
This Article contends that the ministerial exception should be deemed 
nonwaivable and that courts in fact have an obligation to raise it sua sponte 
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when a defendant religious organization fails to do so.265  Although the 
exception does not formally operate as a jurisdictional bar, in the sense that 
courts do not lack subject matter jurisdiction over cases implicating the 
exception, the underlying justification for the exception weighs strongly in 
favor of nonwaivability.266 
The ministerial exception is a necessary corollary of the Establishment 
Clause principle that prevents courts from resolving strictly and purely 
ecclesiastical questions.  The exception applies not just to protect the liberty 
of religious organizations but also because civil government lacks 
competence to resolve religious questions.  If a religious institution waived 
the ministerial exception by failing to raise it in a suit in which it applies, the 
court would be forced to resolve such questions, in violation of the 
Establishment Clause.  In other words, government not only lacks 
prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate the qualifications for ministerial 
employment, but the courts also face an adjudicative disability to deciding 
them.267 
At least one federal court of appeals has recognized this implication of 
Hosanna-Tabor.268  In Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/USA,269 
a female employee was terminated for violating her employer’s rule against 
divorce.270  The court determined that she was a ministerial employee—a 
finding that she did not dispute—but she argued that the employer had 
waived the defense.271  The court categorically rejected the argument that a 
religious institution may waive the ministerial exception where applicable.272  
The court relied on the Hosanna-Tabor Court’s justification for the existence 
of the exception, reasoning that the “constitutional protection is not only a 
personal one; it is a structural one that categorically prohibits federal and state 
governments from becoming involved in religious leadership disputes.”273 
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As a consequence, courts not only should refuse to deem the ministerial 
exception waived by a party’s failure to raise it or by estoppel but also should 
raise it sua sponte in cases in which the facts disclose that it clearly applies.  
Consider the facts of Catholic University II.  The dispute involved the denial 
of tenure to a professor in the canon-law department at the university.274  The 
professor sued and asserted the denial of tenure amounted to gender 
discrimination.275  The university argued that the professor’s canon-law 
scholarship failed to meet the required standards of quality for tenure.276  For 
unknown reasons, the university did not raise the ministerial exception, even 
though litigation of the professor’s claim necessarily involved the question 
whether her scholarship reflected an orthodox understanding of church 
teaching.277  Indeed, the parties conducted extensive discovery, among other 
things about the substance of her scholarship, and then litigated the questions 
at trial.278  As the district court explained, “The parties called eighteen 
witnesses, fourteen of whom were priests or members of a religious order, 
and several were subjected to very vigorous cross-examination.”279 
Immediately after the trial but before judgment, Judge Louis Oberdorfer 
asked the parties to brief the question whether the resolution of the dispute 
would violate the First Amendment.280  After briefing, Judge Oberdorfer 
concluded that the Religion Clauses precluded him from resolving the core 
issue in the suit, which was whether the plaintiff’s scholarship met the 
standards of the university.281  In explaining this conclusion, Judge 
Oberdorfer noted that any grant of tenure to the plaintiff would require 
Vatican consent, which would inevitably be based upon the consistency of 
her scholarship with core teachings of the church.282 
This Article contends that the court properly raised the ministerial 
exception sua sponte when it became clear that the dispute would turn on the 
substance of the plaintiff’s writing and its consistency with church teachings.  
It is not clear why the university failed to raise the ministerial exception, but 
if the court had treated the defense as waived and resolved the substance of 
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the dispute, it inevitably would have violated the Establishment Clause.  To 
resolve the plaintiff’s claims, the court necessarily would have been required 
to adjudicate the quality of the plaintiff’s scholarship about canon law, a 
subject that, at least at this university, was a strictly ecclesiastical matter.283 
In this respect, this Article is critical of Michael Helfand’s approach.  
Helfand contends that the ministerial exception is designed solely to protect 
church autonomy.284  On this view, there should be no bar to adjudication of 
a strictly and purely ecclesiastical question if both parties consent to its 
adjudication by a civil court.  This Article demonstrates that this view is 
inconsistent with both longstanding Establishment Clause norms and the 
Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor, which rests on those norms.285  
Establishment Clause problems cannot be cured by the consent of the parties 
involved.  For example, it would violate the Clause to open a class at a public 
school with prayer even if the teacher and every student present, as well as 
their parents, consented to the practice.286  Similarly, individual litigants 
cannot consent to adjudication of a matter that the Establishment Clause 
withdraws from the competence of a civil court. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of substantive constitutional law, Hosanna-Tabor does not 
create the broad sphere of church autonomy that its biggest proponents or 
opponents would suggest.  Instead, it is a decision that focuses solely on a 
specific set of questions that courts lack competence to resolve.  That 
statement of substantive law, however, masks a potentially complicated set 
of procedural questions.  The Court’s conclusion that the ministerial 
exception is an affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional bar is only the 
start of an appropriate analysis about how to answer those questions. 
Courts should approach those procedural questions in light of the 
underlying justification for the ministerial exception.  The exception reflects 
a longstanding constitutional limitation on the competence of courts to 
resolve “strictly and purely ecclesiastical” questions.287  To conclude that the 
exception operates as an affirmative defense does not alter this fundamental 
limitation on the authority of secular courts.  Any other approach would be 
unfaithful to this limitation. 
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As a practical matter, this means that in litigation between religious 
institutions and their employees, courts may be required to manage discovery 
to resolve threshold questions about the application of the ministerial 
exception before permitting broader discovery.  Similarly, courts should 
consider permitting interlocutory appeals of trial court decisions that deny 
motions for summary judgment based on the exception.  And courts not only 
should conclude that religious institutions do not waive the defense by failing 
to raise it but also ought to raise it sua sponte when the facts indicate that the 
exception may apply.  These departures from the ordinary treatment of 
affirmative defenses are necessary to respect the constitutional principles that 
the Court articulated in Hosanna-Tabor. 
